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I. INTRODUCTION: 1998 AND PROTECTNG THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION
Nineteen ninety-eight is the year that could save the Florida Consti-
tution from being demeaned and trivialized. In 1998, the Florida Consti-
tutional Revision Commission will propose revisions of the Florida
Constitution to the people of Florida.1 A constitutional revision commis-
sion convenes in Florida each twentieth year after the tenth year following
the adoption of the 1968 Florida Constitution.2 The Commission will
consist of the Florida Attorney General,3 fifteen members appointed by the
Governor,4 nine members selected by the Speaker of the Florida House of
Representatives,5 nine members selected by the President of the Florida
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida. B.A.,
1970, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania; J.D., magna cue laude, 1982, Boston
College Law School; M.S., 1973, Boston University; M.P.A., 1974, Northeastern University,
Boston, Massachusetts. Professor Gordon is a member of the Florida and California Bars.
1. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c).
2. Id. § 2(a).
3. Id. § 2(a)(1).
4. Id. § 2(a)(2).
5. Id. § 2(a)(3).
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Senate,6 and three members selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Florida with the advice of the justices of the supreme court. The
Revision Commission will examine the Florida Constitution, except for
matters relating directly to taxation and the state budget, by holding public
hearings.8
The Florida Constitutional Revision Commission should be appointed
and begin convening after the close of the 1997 legislative session.'
Preparations for the convening of the Revision Commission have begun."
Already, Floridians have proposed changes to the Florida Constitution"
and have begun discussions about issues that could result in constitutional
change.12 The Revision Commission, like its 1978 predecessor, could
review many aspects of Florida constitutional law and government.13
However, the most important work of the Commission should be preserving
the integrity of the Florida Constitution by preventing the constitution from
being downgraded to statutory law and a constitutional junkyard. The
Commission needs to spend a considerable amount of time and resources on
considering how the Florida Constitution is changed and amended. 4
Evidence of an emerging state constitutional junkyard was reflected in
the recent comments by a Florida Supreme Court justice concerning the
Florida Constitution, article XI, section 3, the initiative amending pro-
cess. 5 The supreme court justice complained that the supreme status of
Florida constitutional law became threatened by recent proposed amend-
ments to the constitution. Some of those proposed amendments seemed to
the supreme court justice to be more appropriate as statutes. The perma-
6. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)(3).
7. Id. § 2(a)(4).
8. Id. § 2(c). Beginning in 1990 and every tenth year after, a Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission meets to examine the Florida state budgetary process, revenue needs,
tax structure, and governmental productivity and efficiency. Id. § 6.
9. In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor Request of Nov. 19, 1976 (Constitution
Revision Comm'n), 343 So. 2d 17, 24 (Fla. 1977).
10. Stephen T. Maher, The Conference on the Florida Constitution, 68 FLA. B.J. 66
(1994).
11. Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Alfred A. Colby, Some Proposed Changes to the Florida
Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1519 (1994).
12. Stephen T. Maher, The Florida Cabinet. Is It Time for Remodeling, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 1123 (1994).
13. Stephen J. Uhfelder & Robert A. McNeely, The 1978 Constitution Revision
Commission: Florida's Blueprint for Change, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1489 (1994).
14. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-6.
15. See Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d
997, 999-1000 (Fla. 1993) (McDonald, J., concurring).
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nency and supremacy of the Florida Constitution remained jeopardized16
because the Florida Constitution lended itself too easily to amendment.17
What the justice neglected to say was that the Supreme Court of Florida was
being converted into a battleground for social"8 and economic 9 issues.
This battleground threatens the recent movement of the Supreme Court of
Florida toward making the Florida Constitution the primary protection for
individual rights in Florida.2" This has occurred by making Florida
constitutional adjudication susceptible to challenge in the federal courts,
which also happened recently in one other state.21
Preservation of the efficacy of the Florida Constitution requires reform
of the Florida constitutional amendment procedures, especially the initiative
procedures22 which allow the most democratic and politically unrestrained
amendments. The initiative procedures in Florida and elsewhere allow
interest groups to utilize state constitutions as socio-economic battle-
grounds.O This article proposes to curb the initiative procedures of the
Florida Constitution. Not only does the article consider subject matter
restrictions on initiative proposals,24 but the article also considers super-
majority and more deliberative techniques for curbing the social and
economic passions of Floridians in the context of their state constitution.25
This article urges that preference be given to more deliberative techniques
of constitutional change, such as legislative proposals of constitutional
16. aId at 1000.
17. MdJ at 1000 n.2.
18. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Restricts Laws Related to
Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).
19. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d
1336 (Fla. 1994).
20. See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 964 (Fla. 1992) (protecting an accused's
constitutional right to counsel); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 17 (Fla. 1990)
(recognizing constitutional right of privacy for incompetent persons); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d
1186, 1201 (Fla. 1989) (concluding that constitutional right to privacy encompasses minor's
right to terminate her pregnancy). See also Daniel Gordon, Good Intentions - Questionable
Results: Florida Tries the Primacy Model, 18 NOVA L. REv. 759 (1994) (discussing Florida
state constitution).
21. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
22. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
23. See William E. Adams Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges:
Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
583 (1994).
24. See Advisory Opinion - Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 1000 (McDonald,
T., concurring).
25. See infra notes 180-197 and accompanying text.
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amendments, 26 although some commentators have questioned the effective-
ness of those techniques. 27  Hopefully, the 1998 Florida Constitutional
Revision Commission will take action to preserve the supremacy and
efficacy of the Florida Constitution.
II. SYMPTOMS OF THE EMERGING JUNKYARD
Interest groups are slowly converting the Florida Constitution into aprivate law making mechanism. Groups including environmentalists,2 s
agricultural industrialists,2 9 and ethnic communities," have utilized the
initiative election process as a means either to support or oppose social
restrictions 31 and economic benefits.32 The years since 1988 demonstrate
how special interests have enhanced traditional legislative lobbying efforts
by appealing to the electorate's power to amend law through the state
constitutional initiative process. 33  In the nineteen years between the
adoption of the modem Florida Constitution in 19683' and 1987, seven
constitutional amendment initiatives appeared on the ballot.35 In the eight
26. Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 709, 718 (1994).
27. Joseph W. Little & Julius Medenblik, Restricting Legislative Amendments to the
Constitution, 60 FLA. B.J. 43 (1986).
28. The Save our Sealife Committee and the Conservation Committee supported a 1994
initiative limiting certain net fishing off the sea coast of Florida. Advisory Opinion - Marine
Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997.
29. The United States Sugar Corp. and Flo-Sun, Inc. opposed a 1994 initiative aimed
at raising funds to preserve and restore the Everglades. Advisory Opinion - Save Our
Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337.
30. The League of United Latin American Citizens and Haitian American Community
Association of Dade opposed a 1988 proposal to make English the official language of
Florida. In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. English - The Official Language of
Florida, 520 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1988).
31. See Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at
1020.
32. See Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1341.
33. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
34. See Twenty-Five Years and Counting: A Symposium on the Florida Constitution of
1968, 18 NOVA L. REV. 715 (1994).
35. Carroll v. Firestone, 497 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1986) (proposing state controlled lottery);
Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984) (suggesting civil liability limitations); Fine
v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984) (concerning taxation limitations); Floridians Against
Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Florida, 363 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1978) (relating to casino
gambling); Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1976) (concerning ethics in govern-
ment); Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970) (suggesting a unicameral legislature).
In 1986, supporters of legalized gambling again proposed to legalize gambling. Jim Smith,
Vol. 20
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years since 1988, fourteen constitutional amendment initiatives appeared on
the ballot.3
6
The most startling evidence of the interest group creation of a state
constitutional junkyard in Florida was the 1994 election year. Between the
adoption of the modem Florida Constitution in 1968 and the 1992 election,
ten constitutional initiative proposals37 fulfilled the technical requirements
for placement on the ballot. 8 In 1994 alone, ten initiative39 proposals
qualified for pre-election initiative judicial review.' Before 1994, the most
initiative proposals to qualify for ballot inclusion in one year was two.4
1
In 1970, 1976, and 1978, only one proposal made it on the ballot.
The types of initiative proposals facing the Florida voters have changed
a small, but significant, degree over the past twenty-five years. In 1970 and
1976, the first two initiative proposals under the 1968 constitution involved
changes concerning the operations of Florida government.42 After 1976,
So You Want to Amend the Florida Constitution? A Guide to Initiative Petitions, 18 NOVA
L. REV. 1509, 1511 (1994).
36. In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New
Taxes, Property Rights, and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1994) (suggesting four
proposals to limit taxes and property regulation); Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re
Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1994) (supporting casino gambling); Advisory Opinion
to the Att'y Gen. re Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 642 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1994) (limiting
early release of prisoners); Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re Funding for Criminal
Justice, 639 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1994) (proposing criminal justice trust fund); Advisory Opinion
- Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337 (raising funds to preserve and restore the
Everglades); Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at
1021 (restricting laws protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual preference);
Advisory Opinion - Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997 (proposing restrictions
on certain fishing nets); Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Limited Political Terms in
Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991) (providing term limits); In re Advisory
Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Homestead Valuation Limitation, 581 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1991)
(proposing property tax limitations); In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen., Limitation
of Non-Economic Damages in Civil Actions, 520 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1988) (supporting civil
liability limitations); Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So.
2d at 12 (suggesting English as the official language).
37. Smith, supra note 35, at 1510-11.
38. See FLA. STAT. § 100.371 (1993).
39. See supra note 36 for a list of 1994 initiative proposals.
40. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(10).
41. Two proposals appeared on the ballot in 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1992. Smith, supra
note 35, at 1511.
42. The 1970 proposal involved the creation of a unicameral legislature, while the 1976
proposal raised the ethical standards for Florida government officials. See FLA. CONST. art.
HI, § 8.
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initiative proposals involved not only the functioning of government in
Florida but the need of private groups to sponsor their own economic and
social interests in government. Since 1968, three general types of proposals
have emerged through the initiative process. The first and most common
type of initiative sought to transform the structure, responsiveness, and
expense of government. Included in this type of initiative were proposals
to create a unicameral legislature,43 strengthen ethical standards for
government officials,' limit state and local taxes,45 limit the terms of
state and federal elected officials in Florida,46 keep state prisoners incarcer-
ated,47 restrict property regulations,48 and create a state-sponsored lot-
tery.49 A second type of initiative involved the creation or restriction of
economic opportunities. This type of initiative included proposals to create
a gambling industry in Florida,5° limit tort liability,5 limit fishing meth-
ods off the Florida coast,52 and force the Florida agricultural industry to
restore the Everglades.53 The final type of initiative involved proposals to
define group social status within Florida. Two such proposals have either
succeeded or been attempted. One required English to be the official
language of Florida,54 thereby relegating other languages to secondary
positions. The other attempted to forbid legal protection against discrimina-
43. Adams, 238 So. 2d at 825.
44. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 820.
45. Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property Rights,
and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 496; Advisory Opinion - Homestead Valuation Limitation,
581 So. 2d at 587; Fine, 448 So. 2d at 986.
46. Advisory Opinion - Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d
at 226.
47. Advisory Opinion re Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 642 So. 2d at 725; Advisory
Opinion re Funding for Criminal Justice, 639 So. 2d at 973.
48. Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property Rights,
and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 489.
49. Carroll, 497 So. 2d at 1205.
50. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72; Floridians Against Casino
Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 338. In addition to the two initiatives discussed, a third gambling
proposal appeared on the 1986 general election ballot. Smith, supra note 35, at 1511.
51. Advisory Opinion, Limitation of Non-Economic Damages in Civil Actions, 520 So.
2d at 286; Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1353.
52. Advisory Opinion - Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997-98.
53. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337-38.
54. Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 12.
Vol. 20
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tion on the basis of sexual orientation,55 thereby relegating homosexuals to
second class political representation. 6
After 1976, initiatives for economic opportunities became periodic
proposals on the Florida political and legal landscape. One economics
opportunities constitutional amendment was proposed for placement on the
ballot in each general election of 1978,"7 1984,8 1986, 9 and 1988.60
However, not all made it on the ballot. In 1994, two economics opportuni-
ties proposals made it onto the ballot,61 while one failed in pre-election
judicial review. Social status proposals emerged in the late 1980s. In
1988, one appeared on the ballot;63 however, another failed to survive
judicial review in 1994.6' The greatest number of proposals involved the
structure, responsiveness, and expense of government. Over the years since
the adoption of the modem Florida Constitution in 1968, twelve such
proposals have either appeared on the ballot or been struck down by the
Florida courts prior to the election.
65
Indicative of the emerging junkyard in the Florida Constitution is what
has transpired since 1988. Prior to 1988, only three economics opportunities
initiative proposals surfaced in almost twenty years. Since 1988, not only
have four economics opportunities proposals surfaced in six years, but a
whole new category, the social status initiative proposal, has emerged. This
suggests that the initiative proposal process quickly is transforming from a
way for the people of Florida to influence the structure and operations of
55. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1019.
56. See generally Adams, supra note 23.
57. Floridians Against Casino Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 338.
58. Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1353.
59. The initiative in 1986 was another attempt to legalize gambling. Smith, supra note
35, at 1511.
60. Advisory Opinion, Limitation of Non-Economic Damages in Civil Actions, 520 So.
2d at 286.
61. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d. at 72; Advisory Opinion -Limited
Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997-98.
62. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1342.
63. Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 13.
64. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1021.
65. See Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property
Rights, and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 489; Advisory Opinion re Stop Early Release of
Prisoners, 642 So. 2d at 727; Advisory Opinion re Funding for Criminal Justice, 639 So. 2d
at 974; Advisory Opinion - Limited Political Terms in Certain Elected Offices, 592 So. 2d
at 229; Advisory Opinion - Homestead Valuation Limitation, 581 So. 2d at 588; Carroll, 497
So. 2d at 1205; Fine, 448 So. 2d at 986; Weber, 338 So. 2d at 822; Adams, 238 So. 2d at
832.
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their government to a means for promoting economic change and social
ordering.
Ill. AWAY FROM A MODERN CONSTITuTION AND TOWARD
SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYMBOLISM
The initiative process is converting the Florida Constitution into
something that the authors of the 1968 constitution, who worked to create
a modem state constitution,66 which serves as a flexible and adaptable
instrument that enables a state government to work with efficiency and
economy, did not intend.67 A modem state constitution possesses internal
discipline focusing on only what is necessary to support the people's
demands for services and regulatory protections. 8 A state constitution
should remain brief, limited to the basics.69 The subject matter included
in a state constitution should reflect the core of state government avoiding
what would reasonably be considered legislative matters,7" because
constitutionalizing legislative matter places that matter beyond amending by
normal law making processes.71 Including too many matters within a state
constitution can lead to legal fossilization which undermines flexibility in
serving the needs of the people through legislative and regulatory processes.
The 1968 Florida Constitution reflects flexible constitutional mod-
ernism which focuses on core matters. In the early 1960s, the demands of
reapportionment and equal representation in the political process 72 shifted
power in Florida from rural areas to emerging cities and suburbs. 73 This
new, more urban, political alignment created a movement to modernize and
streamline Florida government.74 The modem Florida Constitution flowed
from such a reform-minded context. The 1968 Florida Constitution shrunk
to almost half the size of the text of the amended 1885 Florida Constitu-
tion.75 Not only were racist provisions of the 1885 constitution eliminat-
66. See TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE
GUIDE 11-12 (1991).
67. See Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Forum for Our Time,
54 VA. L. REV. 928, 928-29 (1968).
68. Id. at 939-40.
69. Id. at 942.
70. Id. at 945.
71. Id. at 946.
72. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
73. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 66, at 12.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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ed76 in favor of clear and direct protection of human rights,77 but a
modernized Florida government was fashioned through a simple and flexible
constitution.78
The internal structure of the 1968 Florida Constitution reflects
simplicity devoted to structuring government to serve and regulate. The
document defines the basics. The constitution lays out the foundation of
governance such as state boundaries,79 branches of government,"0 seats of
government,"' and elections." The powers 3 and expectations 4 of the
legislature are defined, along with the powers of the executive branch 5 and
the jurisdiction of the judiciary. 6 Taxation 7 and the structure and
powers of local government 8 constitute the subjects for most of the
remaining content of the 1968 constitution. Most of the 1968 Florida
Constitution creates decision-makers 9 or decisional processes. 90 Very
few specific topics or subjects exist within the constitution. Those that do
exist, such as education, 91 natural resources, and scenic beauty,92 impact
most if not all people in Florida. A miscellaneous section93 includes only
fifteen sections dealing most often with generalized issues such as eminent
domain, 94 sovereign immunity," and an official census.96
76. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 24, art. XII, § 12 (1951).
77. See FLA. CONST. art. I, 88 2, 9.
78. See D'ALEMBERrE, supra note 66, at 11; James Bacchus, Legislative Efforts To
Amend The Florida Constitution: The Implications of Smathers v. Smith, 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 747, 748 (1977).
79. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
80. Id. § 3.
81. Id § 2.
82. Id, art. VI.
83. Id art. III, § 1.
84. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 4, 6.
85. Id, art. IV, § 1.
86. Id art. V, §§ 3-6.
87. Id art. VII.
88. Id art. VIII.
89. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
90. See, e.g., id art. V, § 3(b)(1).
91. Id. art. IX.
92. Id art. II, § 7.
93. Ild art. X.
94. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
95. Id § 13.
96. Id § 8.
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The initiative amendment provision in article XI must be read in the
context of the 1968 Florida Constitution that creates economic and efficient
government able to respond flexibly to the problems of Florida. The
initiative process remains the most restrictive method for changing the
Florida Constitution,97 reserving the right to revise or amend any portion
of the Florida Constitution to Floridians, but only when a revision or
amendment embraces one subject.9" The one subject rule has been read
narrowly by the Florida courts to prevent log rolling where voters were
forced to choose between something they favored and disfavored in one
proposal.99 The initiative procedure is an onerous one requiring the
signatures of hundreds of thousands of Florida voters." The initiative
process remains limited and tedious in order to preserve the streamlined
modernity of the 1968 Florida Constitution.
The initiative provision strikes a balance between populist democracy
and republican, deliberative, representative government in Florida. The
initiative allows the people of Florida to propose singular reforms in the
functions and structure of their state government. 101 The process remains
more restrictive than legislative proposals to amend the Florida Constitu-
tion."° Even a constitutional convention has seemingly unfettered power
to reconsider and rewrite the whole constitution. °'0 The initiative process
remains restrictive compared with legislative proposals and a constitutional
convention because the initiative process lacks the deliberative tools of the
legislature and a constitutional convention such as public hearings,
committee studies, and disciplined public debates." The Florida initiative
process reflects a rule of self-restraint adopted by the people of Florida to
protect against precipitous and spasmodic changes in Florida organic
law. 105
The 1968 Florida Constitution was intended to create efficient and
economic government limited by human rights protections. 1°6  The
initiative process allowed the people of Florida to make changes to the
97. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 66, at 148.
98. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
99. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988-89. See also Marks & Colby, supra note 11, at 1572-
81.
100. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
101. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988.
102. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
103. See id. § 4.
104. See Weber, 338 So. 2d at 824 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
105. See Adams, 238 So. 2d at 832 (Thornal, J., concurring).
106. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
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functions and structures of their government. Unfortunately, since 1988,
initiatives have been utilized to position populations of Florida both socially
and economically."0 7 Initiatives have become an alternative to the deliber-
ative processes of the legislature. Interest groups have added the initiative
process as a method for achieving public policy objectives in addition to
lobbying the legislature. For many of these groups, the Florida Constitution
has been transformed from a modern document of governance to a socio-
economic or ideological battle ground. Between 1968 and 1987, thirteen
organizations made appearances before the Supreme Court of Florida when
the court considered challenges to initiative proposals,108 while between
1988 and 1995, seventy such organizations made such appearances before
the Supreme Court of Florida."° To some extent, this increase reflects a
107. See supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Facing the Challenge: A Lawyer's Response to Anti-Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 665
(1994).
108. The organizations that made appearances between 1968-1987 were as follows:
Excellence Campaign: An Educational Lottery, Inc. ("E.X.C.E.L.") (1986), Florida Teaching
Profession - National Education Association (1986), People Against Legalized Lotteries
(1986), American Civil Liberties Foundation of Florida (1984), Florida Citizens for Tax
Relief and Limited Government Committee (1984), Florida Consumer Federation (1984),
Florida Education Association/United (1984), Floridians for Tax Relief (1984), Pacific Legal
Foundation (1984), Reason 84: The Committee for Citizens Rights (1984), Southeastern
Legal Foundation (1984), Floridians Against Casino Takeover (1978), The Tenants Associa-
tion of Florida (1978).
109. The organizations that made appearances between 1988-1995 were as follows:
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc. (1994), American Family
Political Committee (1994), American Planning Association, Florida Chapter (1994), Ameri-
can Tax Reduction Movement (1994), Associated Industries of Florida (1994), Bally Mfg.
Corp. (1994), Broward County Hispanic Bar Association (1994), Citizens for a Safe Florida
(1994), Common Cause (1994), Conservation Coalition (1994), Defenders of Property (1994),
Farm Credit of Northern Florida, ACA (1994), Farm Credit of Northwest Florida, ACA
(1994), Farm Credit of Southern Florida, ACA (1994), Farm Credit of Southwest Florida,
ACA (1994), FEA/United (1994), Florida Association of Community Relations Professions
(1994), Florida Audobon Society (1994), Florida Chamber of Commerce (1994), Florida
Farmers Fairness Committee (1994), Florida Foresty Association (1994), Florida Farm Bureau
Federation (1994), Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (1994), Florida League of Cities,
Inc. (1994), Florida Locally Approved Gaming, Inc. (FLAG) (1994), Florida Public Interest
Law Section (1994), The Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc. (1994), Florida Tax Reduction
Movement, Inc. (1994), Florida Wildlife Federation (1994), Flo-Sun, Inc. (1994), Friends of
Florida, Inc. (1994), FTP/NEA (1994), Howard Jarvis Tax Payer's Association (1994),
League of Women Voters (1994), Limited Casinos Inc. (1994), National Federation of
Independent Business (1994), National Tax Payer's Union (1994), No Casinos, Inc. (1994),
Proposition for County Choice Gaming, Inc. (1994), Save Our Everglades Committee (1994),
Save Our Sea Life Committee (1994), Sierra Club (1994), Southeastern Legal Foundation
11
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1986 Florida constitutional amendment that formalized the pre-election
judicial review process for initiatives."' However, the dramatic 500%
increase in participating organizations evidences something deeper.
Additionally, the types of organizations militating for and against constitu-
tional change have shifted in the nature of their interests.
Until 1988, the organizations involved in ballot questions tended to be
general lobbying organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Florida,' the Florida Education Association,' 12 the Na-
tional Educational Association, 13 the Florida Consumer Federation," 4
or organizations that focused on the narrow issues involved in the constitu-
tional amendment proposals such as Floridians Against Casino Take-
over,1  People Against Legalized Lotteries," 6 or Excellence Campaign:
An Education Lottery, Inc. ("E.X.C.E.L.")." 7 In the period prior to 1988,
some out of state organizations such as the Pacific Legal Foundation"
8
participated in the struggle for state constitutional change in Florida.
Since 1988, organizational participation evidences social and economic
struggles between broad based and substantial economic and social interests.
General lobbying organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union, 9 and organizations focusing narrowly on the constitutional
(1994), Sugar Cane Growers Co-op of Florida, Inc. (1994), Tax Cap Committee (1994),
United States Sugar Corp. (1994), Citizens for Limited Political Terms (1992), Let The
People Decide - Americans for Ballot Freedom (1992), National Conference of State Legisla-
tures (1992), Save Our Homes, Inc. (1992), Southern Legislative Conference of State Govern-
ments (1992), Tax Cap Foundation, Inc. (1992), Term Limits Legal Institute (1992),
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers (1988), American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc.
(1988), Aspira of Florida (1988), Bilingual Association of Florida (1988), Coalition of
Hispanic American Women (1988), Committee for Constitutional Honesty (1988), Cuban
American Democratic Association of Florida (1988), English First (1988), Florida Committee
for Liability Reform (1988), Florida English Campaign (1988), Greater Miami United (1988),
Haitian American Community Association of Dade (1988), League of United Latin American
Citizens (1988), Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (1988), National
Conference of Puerto Rican Women - Miami Chapter (1988), Puerto Rican Legal Defense
and Education Fund (1988), United States English Legislative Task Force, Inc. (1988).
110. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
111. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 985.
112. Id.
113. See Carroll, 497 So. 2d at 1205.
114. See Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1352.
115. See Floridians Against Casino Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 338.
116. See Carroll, 497 So. 2d at 1205.
117. Id.
118. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 985.
119. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1018.
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amendment question, such as Limited Casinos, Inc.," continue to partici-
pate. However, these organizations have been joined by others that
represent the social interests of millions of people throughout the United
States such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund"' and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund."
Corporate America, including Bally Manufacturing Corporation,"2 Flo-
Sun, Inc.,"2 United States Sugar Corporation,125 and the Florida Farm
Bureau, 6 jumped into the Florida state constitutional fray along with
those who sought to regulate business and property owners, especially in the
environmental realm, including the Sierra Club, 27 the Florida Wildlife
Federation," and the Florida Audobon Society.129
The numbers and types of interest organizations participating in
constitutional amendment litigation evidence the high social and economic
stakes perceived to be at risk in either the passage or defeat of the
amendment proposals. The money infused into the battles over those
proposals also evidences the enormity of the perceived impact of these
amendment proposals on social status and corporate bottom lines. In one
campaign alone, during the Fall of 1994, $16,531,063 was raised to con-
vince the people of Florida to vote in favor of the proposal. 30 In the
weeks before election day, $5,241,984 was contributed by sixty-nine
contributors, many of whom were from out of state.3 On November 1,
120. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72.
121. Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 12.
122. Id.
123. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72.
124. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337.
125. Id.
126. Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property
Rights, and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 488.
127. Id. at 489.
128. Id.
129. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337.
130. Florida Dep't of State, Division of Elections, Campaign Treasurer's Report,
Proposition for Limited Casinos, Inc., Summary Sheet for 11-4-94 to 12-31-94, p.2 . See
generally Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bath Tub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and
Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733, 737 (1994); Gilbert Hahn III &
Stephen C. Morton, Initiative and Referendum - Do They Encourage or Impair Better State
Government, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 925, 941 (1977).
131. Florida Dep't of State, Division of Elections, Campaign Treasurer's Report,
Proposition Limited Casinos, Inc., Summary Sheet for 10-15-94 to 11-3-94, p.2.
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1994, a single out of state corporate supporter of the proposed amendment
gave $1,000,000.132
Consumer, corporate, and ethnic America engaged in battles over,
rather than refined, the modem and flexible Florida Constitution. Corpo-
rate, ethnic, and environmental interests sought either to create or limit
economic opportunities, or to limit social status. In one proposal, environ-
mentalists sought to require the Florida sugar cane industry to pay to clean
up pollution in the Everglades. All sugar cane grown in and near the
Everglades would be taxed one cent per pound, indexed for inflation for
twenty-five years, with the tax receipts placed into a trust fund. 3' A
second proposal sought to permit small and set numbers of gambling casinos
in a few, restricted areas of Florida.'34 Another proposal sought to prevent
the legislature, county commissions, and city commissions from enacting
laws that protect homosexuals from discrimination. 3 5 A final proposal
sought to establish English as the official language of Florida.'36
All four proposals share much in common. The proposals would have
only tangentially restructured or refined state government. Unlike other
proposals that primarily sought to change the workings of state and local
government, 137 these proposals focused on changing human behavior or
relationships. The proposal requiring the sugar industry to underwrite the
costs of restoring the Everglades sought to shift a large measure of wealth
away from one industry for a single public purpose. Such an arrangement
failed to benefit the broad governmental purposes intended to be served by
general taxation. 38 The casino gambling proposal failed to authorize the
Florida Legislature to allow gambling within Florida. Instead, the provision
created a constitutionally mandated monopoly for a relatively small number
of gambling establishments. The opening of additional casinos in the future
would require a subsequent amendment to the Florida Constitution.'
39
The anti-gay and English only proposals subjected sizable subpopulations
in Florida to legislative inflexibility and diminished legal status. No longer
could the legislature protect homosexuals from discrimination." Those
132. Id. at 1.
133. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1338.
134. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72-73.
135. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1019.
136. Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 12.
137. See Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property
Rights, and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 490 (proposing constitutional limit to new taxes).
138. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
139. See id. art. XI.
140. See Adams, supra note 23.
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who spoke other languages would be relegated to a second class status by
their state and local governments as a result of English speakers being
favored constitutionally.
The proposals concerning English as an official language, restrictions
on protecting homosexuals from discrimination, creation of a gambling
casino monopoly, and taxation of the sugar industry pitted groups of
Floridians against each other, or encouraged one group to economically
exploit another. The Florida Constitution has become a weapon in the war
over public policy rather than a tool used to protect human rights and
enhance effective state government. A victory in such a war symbolizes one
economic or social force gaining an advantage over others. The initiative
process is converting the Florida Constitution from a tangible device
supporting law and human rights to a format for symbolic socio-economic
struggle. A constitution utilized in socio-economic struggles is transformed
into a symbolic value system of social and economic inclusion and
exclusion.'41 The Florida Constitution risks becoming a vehicle for
societal discourse 42 instead of a protection from closely defined govern-
mental and legal power.43 The initiative process threatens to convert the
Florida Constitution into an unintelligible babble reflecting clashing
localized and special interest values.'" The initiative process must be
reformed to protect the 1968 Florida Constitution as a modem instrument
empowering efficient and effective government that respects human
rights.1
45
141. See generally KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS
OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993); KENNETH L. KARST,
BELONGING IN AMERICA (1989).
142. See Neil H. Cogan, In Praise of Diverse Discourse, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 173
(1992); James A. Gardner, Discourses and Difference A Reply to Parness and Cogan, 5 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 193 (1992); Jeffrey A. Parness, Failed or Uneven Discourse of State
Constitutionalism? Governmental Structure and State Constitutions, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv.
155 (1992).
143. See Daniel R. Gordon, Super Constitutions Saving The Shunned: The State
Constitutions Masquerading As Weaklings, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 965, 970-79 (1994).
144. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARv. L. REV. 1147 (1993); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitu-
tionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992).
145. See supra notes 106-129 and accompanying text.
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IV. PREVENTING THE EMERGING JUNKYARD: LIMITING DIRECT
DEMOCRACY IN FLORIDA
The 1998 Constitutional Revision Commission" needs to consider
ways to inhibit the initiative process in Florida from converting the Florida
Constitution from a modem instrument of efficient government and
protection against governmental power to a socio-economic interest group
war zone. The single subject and signature requirements 47 for initiative
proposals have helped curb some socio-economic status defining propos-
als.148 Some proposals for shifting social status and economic power in
Florida were too complicated and omnibus to meet the single subject rule.
For instance, the proposal to restrict anti-discrimination protections for
homosexuals impacted municipal home rule powers, such as the basic rights
of all natural persons, the right to bargain collectively, and rights involving
ten enumerated classifications of people.'49 Voters could have been placed
in the position of being log-rolled because they would have to choose
between ideas they both supported and opposed in a single proposal. 50
Furthermore, the initiative proposal involved discrimination which the
Supreme Court of Florida found expansively encompassed civil rights and
the power of all government.' The initiative proposal failed to come
even close to meeting the single subject rule. However, some socio-
economic status defining proposals easily met the single subject rule and
other requirements.'52 The 1998 Revision Commission should consider
adding substantive restrictions on what can be proposed in an initiative
proposal.
The addition of four substantive restrictions along with the procedural
single subject rule and signature requirements should help to limit the use
of initiatives as tools in socio-economic struggles in Florida. The following
146. FLA. CONST. art. Xl, § 2.
147. Id. § 3. See also Cherie B. Albury, Comment, Amendment Nine and the Initiative
Process: A Costly Trip to Nowhere, 14 STETSON L. REv. 349 (1985).
148. See Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at
1020; Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1339-40.
149. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1020.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 75; Advisory Opinion -
Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997; Advisory Opinion English - The Official
Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 11; Advisory Opinion, Limitation of Non-Economic
Damages in Civil Actions, 520 So. 2d at 287.
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four limitations should be added to the Florida constitutional provision
regulating election of constitutional amendment or revision:
153
1) There shall be approval of 60% of electors voting in a general
election for any initiative proposals involving changes:
A. to article I;
B. to article X, section 4; or
C. that the Supreme Court of Florida in its pre-election review of
an initiative deems will diminish equality and equal protection before the
law.
2) No article I right may be directly diminished by an initiative
procedure. The Supreme Court of Florida shall possess the jurisdiction to
determine whether an initiative proposal diminishes an article I right.
3) No change to the Florida Constitution may be made by initiative
when that change involves a limited economic or social interest. The
Supreme Court of Florida shall possess the jurisdiction to determine whether
an initiative proposal involves a limited economic or social interest.
The following requirement should be added to the Florida constitutional
provision empowering the legislature to propose amendments or revisions
to the Florida Constitution:
4) Before an amendment or revision to change article I may appear on
a general election ballot, that proposal, change, or amendment, must be
approved by the Florida Legislature after two consecutive general elections.
These four proposed changes to article XI reflect a balance between
republicanism and popular democracy in Florida. The first proposal allows
the people of Florida to utilize the initiative proceedings to add human rights
protections to article I, to change the homestead protection,155 and to
enhance equal protection. However, the super-majority requirement
encourages the creation of a popular consensus, or at a minimum, strong
public support for the change. The super-majority also discourages such
initiatives by making ultimate electoral success that much more difficult.
The second proposal blocks popular democratic change through the initiative
process when a proposal directly diminishes an article I right. This would
still allow initiative proposals involving executive 56 and legislative
powers'57 that may indirectly diminish article I rights. This proposal also
allows the people of Florida to diminish their basic rights through the
153. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
154. Id. § 1.
155. Id. art. X, § 4.
156. Id. art. IV.
157. Id. art. HI.
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deliberative legislative'58  and constitutional convention159  amending
processes. The will of the people of Florida to diminish the rights of all or
some residents of Florida would be mediated through the established
processes of republican discourse. 6° The last two proposals both diminish
the lure of the initiative process for special interest lobbying groups 161 and
strengthen the deliberative and thoughtfulness of republicanism in Flori-
da.1
62
The pro-republican text of these four proposals exemplifies the tensions
between republicanism and direct democracy in Florida constitutional law
during the past twenty-five years. The Supreme Court of Florida has shown
restraint in blocking initiative proposals from being placed on the general
election ballot. This is because the court has recognized that ultimate
sovereignty resides in the people of Florida, which is a reflection of the
state's constitutional democracy. So long as the people of Florida abide by
the United States Constitution, they should be able to amend their constitu-
tion in ways they see fit.' 63 However, the Supreme Court of Florida
strongly tempered its sensitivity to popular democracy when the court
recognized that the people of Florida injected the single subject requirement
in the initiative process as a rule of self-restraint on populist decisions. The
rule of self-restraint protected the people of Florida against their own desire
to make precipitous and spasmodic changes in Florida organic law.' 1 The
Florida courts play an important role in guarding that self-restraint by
insuring the single subject and other initiative requirements are satisfied.' 65
The Supreme Court of Florida also recognized that the initiative procedure
should never be utilized to bring about revolutionary or far-reaching change.
Constitutional conventions exist for that purpose. 166 Restraint of populism
was necessary to preserve the Florida Constitution as a basic document that
controls governmental functions, including republican functions. 67 The
1968 Florida Constitution could not be converted into an amended jumble
158. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
159. Id. § 4.
160. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Law Making Is Not "Republican Government":
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 32-33 (1993).
161. See supra notes 107-132 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 170-175 and accompanying text.
163. See Floridians Against Casino Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 342 (Boyd, J., concurring
specially); Weber, 338 So. 2d at 821.
164. See Adams, 238 So. 2d at 832 (Thornal, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 831.
167. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989.
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as the 1885 Florida Constitution had been.168 Overall, the Supreme Court
of Florida found that the single subject and other initiative requirements
favored, and even protected, republicanism in Florida.169
The tension between popular democracy and republicanism in Florida
reflects a recent national legal scholarship discussion concerning the merits
of the two opposing viewpoints. 7 ' Initiatives, as a strong form of popular
democracy, serve to overcome entrenched factional interests. When
legislative bodies refuse to reform themselves, initiatives serve to supple-
ment representative government, correcting egregious legislative excess-
es. 7 ' Republican government was constituted in the United States to
foster popular democracy. 72 Direct vehicles of democracy such as
initiatives are integral parts of the American republican system. 173  The
pro-republican critics of direct popular democracy are not fueled by
concerns of legislative excesses and the need for the people to reform and
control their government. Instead, the republican critics of popular
democracy oppose the use of initiatives as a means to stigmatize minority
groups through law.7  More specifically, the modem champions of
republicanism fear the initiative as a means of blocking minorities from
lobbying in state legislatures and local commissions for equal and human
rights and from being protected equally by state law and the political
process. 75
Those who both favor and fear initiatives fail to focus on the same
issues. Those who favor initiatives fear unresponsive representative
168. See Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1358 (McDonald, J., concurring).
169. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
170. For an excellent overview of the modem debate and a bibliography, see William
E. Adams, Jr. Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative - The Technical Challenges, Pamphlet distributed
at the Annual Meeting of the Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues Section of the Association of
American Law Schools (Jan. 6, 1995).
171. See Dennis V. Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distress: The
Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State ConstitutionalAmendment by Initiative
Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 5, 39, 44-45, 48-49, 53 (1992).
172. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 757-58
(1994).
173. Id. at 761.
174. See Adams, supra note 23, at 831; Linde, supra note 160, at 37-38; James M.
Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43 (1983).
175. See Adams, supra note 23, at 602-3; Fischer, supra note 174, at 69; Linde, supra
note 26, at 709, 721-23; Linde, supra note 160, at 41-42.
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government,176 while those who criticize initiatives fear popular and biased
passions. 77  Florida constitutional philosophy shifts the democracy-
republican balance toward responsive government and against less delibera-
tive popular democracy. 78 Hence, Florida constitutional philosophy fails
directly to reflect the concerns of the modem critics and devotees of
initiative processes. Florida republican philosophy strengthens legislative
power,'7 9 but evidences little or no concern for majoritarian ballot box
oppression of socially or economically disadvantaged groups. However, the
Floridian preference for republicanism indirectly serves the minority
protective interests of those who fear initiatives. The power of the initiative
remains somewhat limited, while the Florida Legislature remains accessible
as the law maker even to minorities.
Proposals to require super-majorities for initiative proposals involving
human rights and to restrict initiative proposals that diminish human rights
fit well with traditional Florida constitutional philosophy. Traditionally,
Florida constitutional philosophy has favored republicanism over direct
democratic law making. The Florida Legislature would remain open to
those who petition for greater human rights protections, and the basic rights
already guaranteed in the 1968 Florida Constitution would remain protected.
Proposals to curb initiatives that threaten human rights, or require super-
majorities for constitutional change, are not unprecedented both in and out
of Florida.180 In fact, some states already include substantive restrictions
to initiatives or super-majority requirements within their constitutions.
California prohibits all referenda and initiatives that name any individual to
office or assign any power or duty to a private corporation.' Illinois
restricts the subject of constitutional initiatives to proposals that would
change the structure and procedure of the legislature. 82  Massachusetts
forbids initiative amendments relating to religion, religious matters, or
religious institutions.'83 Initiatives in Illinois require for passage either
176. See Arrow, supra note 171, at 44-46.
177. See Linde, supra note 26, at 721-25.
178. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988-89; Weber, 338 So. 2d at 823-24 (England, J.,
concurring and Roberts, J., dissenting); Adams, 238 So. 2d at 832.
179. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989.
180. See Little & Medenblik, supra note 27, at 45; Christopher A. Coury, Note, Direct
Democracy Though Initiative and Referendum: Checking the Balance, 8 NoTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 573, 590-92 (1994).
181. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 12.
182. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. See also Fischer, supra note 174, at 55 n.58.
183. MASS. CONST. art. 48, Part II, § 2. See also Alexander G. Gray, Jr., & Thomas
R. Kiley, The Initiative and Referendum in Massachusetts, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 27, 54-56
Vol. 20
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/10
Gordon
approval by 60% of the people voting on the proposal or a majority of
people voting in the state wide election. 84 Even states that allow only
legislative proposals of constitutional amendments require super- majorities.
New Hampshire requires 66% approval of people voting1s5 while New
Mexico requires 75% for proposed amendments involving the elective
franchise or Hispanic education.
86
The super-majority and subject restriction proposals for the initiatives
will go a long way toward preventing the Florida Constitution from
becoming a socio-economic status defining junkyard. Two additional
proposals should help to preserve the integrity of the Florida Constitution.
First, no initiative will be permitted when the initiative involves a limited
economic or social interest.1 17  Such a restriction should stop special
interest groups from using the Florida Constitution as a means to attaining
very limited economic or social goals such as creating an economic
monopoly88 or restricting one type of behavior such as homosexuali-
ty." 9  Such a restriction also finds support in Florida constitutional
jurisprudence which has disfavored law that restricted social"9 and
economic'91 opportunities to the detriment of small classes or inter-
ests."l Second, the last proposal of the four discussed in this article 93
would require that any legislatively proposed changes to article I be
(1991).
184. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
185. N.H. CoNsT. art. 100. See also Albert L. Sturm, The Procedure of State
Constitutional Change, With Special Emphasis on the South and Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U. L
REV. 569, 574 (1977); Little & Medenblik, supra note 27, at 45.
186. N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1. See also Fischer, supra note 174, at 496 n.30.
187. See supra part IV.
188. See Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72. The proposal would
have allowed the establishment of a limited number of gambling casinos, thereby
constitutionalizing the existence of those businesses and requiring further constitutional
amendments for the creation of competitor casinos.
189. See Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at
1019.
190. See Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993). See also Gordon, supra note 143,
at 974-77.
191. See Department of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d
1032 (Fla. 1986); Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962); Larson v. Lesser,
106 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1958).
192. See Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d at 1034; Liquor Store,
Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949). See also Daniel R.
Gordon, Ecomomic Liberty as the Basis of Social Liberty: Bowers Revisited in the Context
of State Constitutions, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1009, 1030-31 (1992).
193. See supra part IV.
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approved by the Florida Legislature after two consecutive general elec-
tions.194
Restricting legislative proposals involving human and basic rights
strengthens the deliberative quality of Florida republicanism and lawmak-
ing.195 This proposal has an analog in the Florida constitutional conven-
tion process'96 and parallels broad proposals made a decade ago restricting
legislatively proposed constitutional amendments.' 97  Two successive
general elections are required before a constitutional convention can be
convened.198 At the first election, the people of Florida decide whether
they desire to call a convention. Two years later, the people of Florida
choose their representatives to a constitutional convention. 99 Requiring
two elections over a two-year period allows popular passions to cool and
encourages less passionate and more thoughtful consideration of the
proposed revisions. A similar two-year cooling off period for legislatively
proposed amendments involving human and basic rights would encourage
a less passionate deliberation process for both the legislature and the people.
Nevada also requires two consecutive general elections to pass before any
proposed constitutional changes will be approved.2"°
V. CONCLUSION
The 1998 Florida Constitutional Revision Commission faces the
challenge of preventing the Florida Constitution from becoming a socio-
economic status defining junkyard. The Revision Commission must devise
the means for preserving the modernity, effectiveness, and flexibility of the
1968 Florida Constitution. Restricting the initiative proposal in Florida
even further than the current single subject and other requirements would
help to preserve the constitution, republicanism, and respect for pluralism
and diversity. The Revision Commissi6n should consider placing substan-
tive subject restrictions in the initiative process, requiring super- majorities
to approve proposals involving human and basic rights, restricting initiative
proposals that involve limited economic or social interests, and requiring
that legislatively proposed amendments involving article I be approved by
the legislature after two consecutive elections. The Revision Commission
194. Id.
195. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988.
196. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
197. See Little & Medenblik, supra note 27, at 44.
198. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4(b).
199. Id.
200. NEv. CONST. art. 19, § 2(4).
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should not fear the novelty of these proposals. Similar proposals have been
made before, and a number of states already include similar restrictions in
their constitutions. If the Revision Commission still fears such proposals as
too novel, the Commission should analyze the purpose of its existence. The
Revision Commission itself is a novel approach to amending a state
constitution."'
201. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 66, at 147.
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